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THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSIVENESS AND THE 
OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF JUDGMENTS IN 
KANT’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY 
ROLF-PETER HORSTMANN

 
The title of this paper is somewhat misleading because talk of ―the 
problem of purposiveness‖ suggests both that there is a clear-cut 
conception of purposiveness in Kant’s philosophy and that this conception 
poses a single basic problem. As everyone who is but a little familiar with 
Kant’s writings knows, this is definitely not the case. There are already in 
his theoretical philosophy at least three different contexts in which the 
conception of purposiveness plays a decisive role in Kant’s thought. The 
first relates to the possibility of empirical laws of nature and, somehow 
connected with it, to the possibility of empirical concepts. The second has 
to do with the theory of natural ends or of organized products of nature. 
Both these contexts belong to what could be called Kant’s philosophy of 
nature (in a broad sense), and purposiveness is considered here as a quality 
that has to be attributed to nature and some of nature’s products. The third 
context has to do with aesthetics and concerns the explanation of the 
source of the validity of judgments of aesthetic appraisal. It is by no means 
clear whether Kant relies on the very same conception of purposiveness in 
all these contexts. It is more obvious that there is not just one single or 
dominant problem connected with Kant’s treatment of purposiveness. Not 
only does the idea of purposiveness in each of these contexts lead to 
different problems, but there are also some more general problems, the 
most prominent of which has become, in recent years, the question as to 
how to integrate the claims Kant makes in these different contexts with 
respect to purposiveness into the overall framework of his critical 
philosophy. In what follows I will deal with some aspects of this more 
general problem under two restrictions. First, I will confine my remarks to 
those aspects of this problem that concern Kant’s epistemology. This 
limitation means that I ignore his aesthetic theory and especially his 
analysis of the so-called judgment of taste. Second, I will limit my 
remarks to topics that have a connection with the question as to whether 
and how purposiveness can have a function within the Kantian 
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epistemological framework and whether and how purposiveness fits into 
Kant’s analysis of the conditions of the objective validity of judgments.  
So, first of all, why does the topic of purposiveness become a matter of 
concern in relation to Kant’s epistemology at all? In order to explain this 
one can start with three observations, two of which I take to be fairly 
uncontroversial. These observations taken together lead to some 
perplexities. (1) If one takes Kant’s first Critique, the Critique of Pure 
Reason, in both of its editions (1781 and 1787) to contain the conceptual 
and argumentative basis of his theory of knowledge and cognition (and if 
one had to give an unbiased account of its leading ideas), it would be 
rather likely that the concept of purposiveness of nature plays no major 
role for the simple reason that in the epistemological parts of the first 
Critique (Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic) this concept 
does not occur at all (at least not in a philosophically relevant way). This 
absence means that within the framework of the first Critique there seems 
to have been no compelling reason for Kant to think of purposiveness of 
nature as an essential element of a theory of empirical knowledge, i.e., of 
experience, an element without which one could not account for the 
possibility of experience. (2) Three years after the second edition of the 
first Critique the situation had changed significantly. In his third Critique, 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment from 1790, or, to be more precise, 
in both versions of the Introduction to this third Critique, we find Kant 
claiming that without what he now calls the ―principle of purposiveness of 
nature‖ the very possibility of experience would be incomprehensible. In 
view of the fact that Kant in the first Critique promises to provide all the 
basic elements that are needed to account for empirical knowledge, i.e., 
experience, this claim sound surprising and hard to reconcile with the first 
Critique. Already this discrepancy between the first and the third Critique 
is somewhat bewildering and calls for an explanation, especially because 
Kant nowhere in the third Critique even hints at a change in his position 
with respect to some of his epistemological principles argued for in the 
first Critique in order to account for purposiveness. Quite a number of 
Kant scholars have embarked upon coming up with very different 
suggestions and hypotheses.
1
 (3) The third somewhat puzzling and perhaps 
 
 
 1. To mention just a few: HANNAH GINSBORG, THE ROLE OF TASTE IN KANT’S THEORY OF 
COGNITION (1990) holds that the first Critique, because it cannot account for empirical concept 
formation, had to be completed by the third Critique; JOHN H. ZAMMITO, THE GENESIS OF KANT’S 
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1992) takes the discovery of the cognitive significance of purposiveness, next 
to its practical and aesthetic value, to be the distinguishing mark of the third Critique; Henry E. 
Allison, Is the Critique of Judgment “Post-Critical,” in THE RECEPTION OF KANT’S CRITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL 78 (Sally Sedgwick ed., 2000) claims that the third 
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not that uncontroversial observation is the following: within the 
epistemological framework of the first Critique the concept of 
purposiveness of nature is not only not used as a systematically significant 
concept, but there are quite a few reasons that suggest that it might be 
difficult to find a place for such a principle employing the resources of the 
first Critique alone. If this were the case, then Kant indeed would have a 
problem with purposiveness, a problem that jeopardizes his whole critical 
project.  
Now, if one goes along with these observations two questions arise 
immediately: (1) Why is it that the principle of purposiveness does not or 
even—if one accepts my third observation—cannot play an 
epistemologically indispensable role within the first Critique, and (2) how 
does it come that it has to play such a role in the third Critique?
2
 The 
answer to these questions I want to suggest is (a) that the conceptual 
framework of the first Critique proved to be too poor to allow for natural 
organisms to be genuine objects of nature, and (b) that in order to account 
for them as natural phenomena one had to bring in the concept of 
purposiveness as designating an epistemic principle in its own right. 
Though the answer to the (b)-part might sound familiar it is the (a)-part 
whose details are, I think, somewhat surprising. My remarks will deal in 
the first part with my claim concerning the first Critique and the second 
part will address the topic of purposiveness in the third Critique.  
 
 
Critique contains just a re-interpretation of what is meant by systematicity and thus that there is no 
discrepancy between the first Critique and the third Critique; Paul Guyer, Kant on the Systemacity of 
Nature: Two Puzzles, 20 HIST. PHIL. Q. 277 (2003) seems to agree with Allison on this point; RACHEL 
ZUCKERT, KANT ON BEAUTY AND BIOLOGY: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 
(2007) sees the difference in Kant’s tackling a new problem in the third Critique, i.e., the problem of 
the lawfulness of the contingent. 
 2. These questions are not the same as the question as to why there has to be a transcendental 
deduction for the principle of purposiveness, though indeed all these questions are connected. In an 
earlier paper dealing with the latter question, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Why There Has to Be a 
Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, in KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL 
DEDUCTIONS 157 (Eckart Förster ed., 1989), I made the distinction between a ―critical‖ and a 
―systematic‖ problem with respect to the principle of purposiveness in Kant. Regarding the systematic 
problem, I suggested a somewhat terminological solution by proposing that there is a shift in the 
meaning of the term ―transcendental‖ that allows Kant to think of his views about purposiveness in the 
first Critique and the third Critique as being compatible. Though I still believe this shift to be the case 
I want in the paper here to pursue a different line of thought. I want to argue now that the shift in 
terminology is just an indicator for a substantial change in position by Kant, the reasons for which I 
want to discuss here. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I 
Let me begin with pointing out the limitations of Kant’s theory as 
presented in the first Critique regarding natural organisms. In order to 
understand these limitations one has to give a (very sketchy and very 
basic) summary of the central claims of the first Critique with regard to 
the possibility of knowledge. The basic idea in the first Critique is that we 
can have knowledge only of what we produce by ourselves. It is this claim 
that qualifies Kant as a constructivist in epistemology. Thus if we want to 
have knowledge of some object we have to produce or construe it. This 
task is done in a rather straightforward way in that we perform some 
operations on a material that is given to us as a manifold of sensations. 
This material, out of which we construe objects (―the sensible given‖), is 
as such cognitively neutral, i.e., it is undetermined with respect to its 
objective content. In order to produce the representation of an object the 
cognizing subject has to manipulate the given material in such a way that 
it gives rise to the representation of the object (and not just to a fleeting 
stream of maybe connected or maybe unconnected impressions). This 
manipulation is done by the operations of two of our cognitive faculties. 
Kant calls these faculties ―sensibility‖ and ―understanding.‖ They provide 
us with the formal conditions of the possibility of an object of knowledge, 
i.e., with those conditions without which the very concept of an object (of 
knowledge) would be unobtainable for us.  
Sensibility makes available the spatio-temporal framework into which 
we have to position as either inside or outside of us whatever is to become 
an object for us. This idea that the space-time frame necessary for any 
object of which we can have knowledge is rooted in a subjective capacity 
of a cognizing subject makes Kant an idealist. The understanding 
contributes the rules of composition that constitute the very concept of an 
object (the concept of an ―Objekt überhaupt‖)3 and to which all the spatio-
temporally given material out of which we construe objects has to 
conform. These rules are called categories. They can be found 
independently from any experience through a ―transcendental‖ 
investigation. This claim makes Kant a transcendental idealist. 
What is important to notice here is that for Kant these constructive 
efforts lead not just to the concept of an object (of knowledge) but they 
also allow us to produce a specific conception of nature, namely the 
 
 
 3. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON B158 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood 
trans., 1998) (1787) [hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON]. The Critique of Pure Reason is quoted 
according to the original pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. 
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conception of nature as a homogenous and unified (einheitliches) whole of 
objects. This is so because whatever is to become an object for us has to 
satisfy according to Kant at least three relational requirements imposed 
categorically by the understanding: (1) it has to be conceived as a 
persisting substance with changeable attributes,
4
 (2) any change of its state 
has to be subject to the law of causality, and (3) it has to stand in mutual 
causal relation (Wechselwirkung) with all other objects that exist at the 
same time. These three requirements are supposed to guarantee that 
everything we experience as an object in space and time is somehow 
connected with everything else in a rule-governed fashion, thus giving rise 
to the view that the sum total (Inbegriff) of all objects that can appear to 
us, i.e., nature, have to form an orderly structured whole. In a certain sense 
this requirement comes as no surprise given the initial conviction that, in 
order to be known, objects have to be taken as subject-dependant 
constructions. Thus according to this outline what Kant presents in the 
first Critique—at least in the parts preceding the Transcendental 
Dialectic—is a theory of object constitution in order to account for the 
epistemic accessibility of the world by us. Kant’s message is quite clear: if 
there is any sensory input—in his terminology, any matter of sensation 
(Materie der Empfindung)—given to us then we get objects out of this 
input that qualify as objects for knowledge and which fit together into a 
unified ensemble of objects called nature only under the condition that we 
constitute them by subjecting this input to the rules of our understanding 
under the conditions of our sensibility. This process is the reason these 
rules are called by Kant ―constitutive principles‖: they constitute objects 
and provide these objects with traits that allow them to build up nature as a 
coherent whole, which in turn makes it possible for us to have uniformity 
of experience. 
Kant is cautious enough not to claim that these constructive means, the 
categories, determine objects right down to the empirical individual level. 
For example the specific qualities an individual object of experience may 
have, let us say: this specific shade of red, the particular changes it might 
undergo—maybe turning yellow from red, or the special causal relations it 
could stand in—perhaps causing something other to burn, none of which 
are determined by the principles of object constitution that the categories 
bring about. These characteristics are contingent. ―Contingent‖ here means 
that there is no categorical basis for the specific empirical features of an 
 
 
 4. See id. at B224. Whether the First Analogy allows one to speak of objects as individual 
substances is by no means clear because what is said there is, strictly speaking, that there is just one 
substance whose states are the individual things. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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object—that these determinate features are just what they are, 
independently from the functioning of any of the categories. Presumably 
these characteristics have something to do with the material of sensation. 
This does not mean that there are no rules at all that regulate these 
features. On the contrary, they are all governed by empirical laws that 
again are contingent from a categorical point of view. 
If this is a correct (though somewhat superficial) characterization of 
Kant’s approach concerning the possibility of empirical knowledge and 
experience
5
 in the first Critique, then how does the idea that nature has to 
be organized in a purposeful way in order for us to have experience, i.e., 
knowledge of objects, fit in? Before I answer this question I have to point 
out shortly what is meant by this idea. It is easy to imagine that nature is 
organized in such a way that it would be impossible for us to discover any 
regularities or any order in what we experience. In such a situation we 
would just be confronted with a lot of distinct and ever-changing 
perceptions whose sequences would be utterly chaotic and which would 
have no stable characters at all.
6
 If this were the case, experience, in the 
sense of empirical knowledge, would be impossible because there would 
be no opportunity for us to even arrive at empirical concepts, let alone to 
establish empirical laws. Without having such laws at our disposal, it 
makes no sense to speak of experience or knowledge in a comprehensible 
way. Thus, in order to account for the possibility of empirical knowledge 
one has to presuppose that nature is organized in such a way that is 
purposeful to our epistemic needs. How detailed a Kantian picture of the 
world the organization of nature has to be in order to meet these needs is 
in itself an interesting question that cannot be tackled here. At any rate, the 
organization of nature has to be such that it allows for concepts and laws.  
This idea that nature has to be organized purposefully in order for us to 
have knowledge has some interesting and far-reaching consequences, 
which Kant spells out extensively in his third Critique. Two of these 
consequences have to be mentioned. The first is that this reasoning gives 
rise to the thought of the unavoidability of the assumption of a super-
sensible being that is responsible for the purposeful organization of nature. 
The second, which is of immediate interest here, is that the idea of 
purposiveness of nature seems to introduce into our conception of nature a 
second type of causality next to the mechanical causality of moving forces 
(bewegende Kräfte), namely a causality according to ends. It is especially 
 
 
 5. As is well known, Kant defines experience as empirical knowledge. See id. at B147, B166. 
 6. For Kant’s example of the cinnabar see id. at A100. 
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this second consequence of the idea of a purposefully organized nature 
that gives rise to tensions with central claims of the first Critique, 
especially with the claim that causal relations are irreversible, a claim that 
leads to conceding a privileged status to mechanical causality. 
Now, the question is: Can the idea of a purposefully organized nature 
play a constitutive role within Kant’s first-Critique model as to how for us 
experience or empirical knowledge is possible? Or in other words: If one 
agrees that constitutive principles have to be founded in categories, can the 
concept of purposiveness function as a category in the first Critique? The 
answer seems to me to be no. This is so because of four reasons. In my 
eyes, three of them are good reasons, the fourth—again in my eyes—a 
very good reason. The first (1) consists of a puzzlement that arises from a 
rather external perspective. The second (2) has to do with an assessment of 
the task of a transcendental investigation of the conditions of knowledge. 
The third (3) concerns the concept of causality. And the fourth (4) is that 
Kant himself speaks out against the categorical status of purposiveness. I 
will comment shortly on each of these reasons. 
(1) The conception of nature as purposefully organized to our epistemic 
needs by a super-sensible organizer seems to be in some ways at odds with 
Kant’s leading epistemological credo, that nature as an object of 
knowledge is constituted by us (the knowing subjects). One is inclined to 
think that if it is us who produce nature as an epistemic object by our 
category-guided conceptual activities we should assume that we do it 
correctly, in the sense of purposefully, because otherwise there would be 
nothing for us to know or, even worse, the whole concept of a knowing 
subject would make no sense. Thus if nature, as an object of knowledge, is 
supposed to be our product then the very fact that there is such an object 
seems to somehow guarantee that nature is purposefully organized. If it 
were otherwise we could forget about objects at all. Hence to introduce the 
idea of the purposiveness of nature, as a necessary condition for its 
epistemic accessibility, seems to be a bit puzzling and rightly so. One 
might say that it is not nature, understood as a product of our conceptual 
activities, that is meant to be purposefully organized but rather it is a claim 
about nature in the sense of the data, the matter of sensation. This 
argument, however, is just poor reasoning because it infers the constitution 
of a cause from what is taken to be its effects. It might just as well be 
chance instead of purposiveness that accounts for the organization of the 
material of sensation. 
(2) The second reason has to do with the epistemological task of the 
first Critique. Kant is quite explicit about this task. He wants to provide a 
transcendental justification (whatever that might be) of a list of concepts 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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without which we could not have the representation of an object of 
knowledge, or, in his terminology, he wants to give a transcendental 
account ―that and how‖ certain concepts are constitutive of the concept of 
an object.
7
 Kant does not hint in the first Critique at entertaining the view 
that part of this task is to come up with a theory of how the raw material of 
sensation, out of which we construe our objects of knowledge, has to be 
organized. On the contrary: Kant is quite cautious in this respect. He just 
refers to these data as to the ―given manifold of sensibility‖ that somehow 
is an enabling condition for our having representations of objects but with 
respect to which we cannot say anything as to their constitution and their 
behavior. And Kant is well advised to be cautious with regard to the 
characteristics of this sensible manifold considered in itself because 
otherwise Kant himself would give support to the widely held view—
effectively formulated for the first time by F.H. Jacobi—that his 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves is unconvincing. 
Thus there is not really a place for the idea of a purposefully organized 
nature or for the concept of purposiveness to function as an object-
constituting concept in the first Critique because Kant does not want to 
think of this concept as a constitutive principle based on a category. 
(3) This leads directly to the third reason, which is the most frequently 
articulated misgiving in this context. What if it were the case that Kant in 
the first Critique would permit the concept of purposiveness to be an 
object-constituting concept, i.e., a category? This would seem to bring 
about some problems with regard to the status and the function of the 
category of causality because it would make it unavoidable to allow the 
notion of what Kant calls ―causality according to ends‖ to enter the list of 
conditions necessary for the constitution of objects of knowledge next to 
or even in opposition to the notion of a mechanical causality of moving 
forces. What this means and what it implies are hard to figure out exactly. 
But it is fairly clear that there are strong motives on Kant’s part in the first 
Critique to stay away from giving purposiveness a categorical status.
8
  
(4) Fortunately there are not only these three reasons one can put 
forward in order to substantiate the claim that the idea of a purposefully 
organized nature does not make that much sense in the context of the first 
Critique. In my eyes, the most convincing reason is that Kant himself 
 
 
 7. See id. at B80 (Kant’s characterization of transcendental cognition); see also id. at B122, 
B197 (noting his remark on the problem of the objective validity of the subjective conditions of 
cognition at B122 and the highest principle of all synthetic judgments at B197). 
 8. Among other things, giving purposiveness a categorical status would make it difficult to 
reject the objective validity of the argument from design. See id. at A648. 
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indicates what the role of the principle of purposiveness within the 
framework of the first Critique should be: it should be taken to be a useful 
but by no means objectivity grounding maxim of reason. Kant outlines his 
standpoint quite explicitly, though in a rather obscure way, in two little 
chapters that form the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.
9
 The 
upshot of what he says there is the following: the principle of 
purposiveness and some other principles are indeed necessary assumptions 
in order to guide our scientific research that consists in finding empirical 
laws. But this does not mean that they are ―of constitutive use, so that 
[through this use] the concepts of certain objects would thereby be 
given . . . .‖10 They are necessary heuristic principles or methodological 
devices,
11
 they represent unavoidable hypotheses of reason, and their 
status is that of regulative principles.
12
 As such they are subjective 
principles that have nothing to do with the constitution of an object of 
knowledge but satisfy a necessary interest of reason. All this is nicely 
expressed in Kant’s definition of a maxim of reason, which reads:  
I call all subjective principles that are taken not from the 
constitution of the object but from the interest of reason in regard to 
a certain possible perfection of the cognition of this object, maxims 
of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative reason, which rest 
solely on reason’s speculative interest, even though it may seem as 
if they were objective principles.
13
  
Thus I conclude that the principle of purposiveness does not fit into the 
neat and clean picture Kant presents of the world as an object of 
knowledge in the first Critique. In this world we constitute these objects in 
 
 
 9. Id. at B670–B732. 
 10. Id. at B672. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at B675. 
 13. Id. at B694. In the original German: 
Ich nenne alle subjektiven Grundsätze, die nicht von der Beschaffenheit des Objekts, sondern 
dem Interesse der Vernunft, in Ansehung einer gewissen möglichen Vollkommenheit der 
Erkenntnis dieses Objekts, hergenommen sind, Maximen der Vernunft. So gibt es Maximen 
der spekulativen Vernunft, die lediglich auf dem spekulativen Interesse derselben beruhen, ob 
es zwar scheinen mag, sie wären objective Prinzipien. 
Though the message Kant wants to convey in the Appendix is quite clear there are, as is well known, 
some problems connected with his way to integrate this message into the overall framework of his 
epistemological convictions as presented in the first Critique. It is especially not that easy to 
understand his claim that these maxims have the status of subjective or logical principles that 
nevertheless presuppose transcendental principles. See Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Der Anhang zur 
transzendentalen Dialektik, in KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT 525, 525 (Georg Mohr & Marcus 
Willaschek eds., 1998). 
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an idealistic framework in such a way that they and their behavior can be 
explained by matter, motion, and moving forces according to the 
principles of Newtonian physics. Whatever does not conform to these 
principles is for us not an object of knowledge at all. And if we cannot 
help having recourse to the notion of purposiveness in order to describe 
(beurteilen) something or other, we are perfectly free to do so if we bear in 
mind that such a description has no explanatory force because it has no 
basis in the constitution of the object of knowledge but is just a subjective 
condition, an impulse or a drive that somehow is connected with reason. 
II 
What then could have been a reason for Kant to change this position 
and to claim as he definitely does in the third Critique
14
 that without the 
principle of purposiveness there would be no unity of experience and thus 
no experience possible? One way to approach this question is to ask a 
different question, namely: What could be thought to be missing in Kant’s 
ultimately physicalistic epistemic universe as outlined in the first Critique 
of which we like to claim to have experience or empirical knowledge? One 
can imagine quite a number of candidates. In the first place, and most 
remarkably, what appears to be completely absent from Kant’s 
epistemically accessible world are all non-physical objects (with the 
exception of mathematical objects). Thus, it looks as if not only rather 
questionable objects like souls or spirits or apparitions are excluded from 
Kant’s world of experience, but also objects that are considered to be 
much more strongly embedded in our everyday life, like: economical (the 
market, money, insurance); juridical (contract, rights); political (state, 
society); and cultural (university, opera) objects. One might object that all 
these objects are artifacts, manufactured by us, and as such also 
constituted by us according to rules, and are thus objects of knowledge. 
However, this effort on behalf of a Kantian epistemic world to integrate 
those objects has its own problems
15
 that Kant never cared to address (but 
Hegel did) because quite obviously Kant was not interested in the question 
 
 
 14. E.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 181–86, at 20-26 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 
1987) (1790) [hereinafter KANT, JUDGMENT] (Introduction, Section V); id. at 204’, 204’ n.13, at 393 
(First Introduction); id. at 208’, at 396–97 (First Introduction). Page references, e.g., 181–86, are to the 
Akademie edition, with the primed numbers referring to volume 20 and the unprimed numbers 
referring to volume 5 of the Akademie edition. The second page number, e.g., 20–26, refers to the 
corresponding page in the 1987 Pluhar edition, as translated by Pluhar. 
 15. For example, why is it that there are no reliable forecasts of the behavior of such objects? 
Why don’t we know the rules of construction of these objects? 
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of non-physical objects of any kind at all. But even if one is prepared to 
accept Kant’s austere physicalistic conception in the first Critique as to 
what counts as an object of knowledge belonging to nature it can be 
regarded as too poor because one can have the suspicion that it cannot 
even do justice to all natural phenomena.  
Three shortcomings should be mentioned: (1) Kant’s account cannot 
integrate organisms into the fabric of what for him is objective nature, 
because this account seems to allow only objects constituted by 
mechanical processes as objectively real occurrences in the world and 
seems to have no basis to incorporate physical objects whose form and 
constitution cannot be explained mechanically by the causal interaction of 
moving forces alone. (2) What can be seen to be a problem with Kant’s 
account is also that it cannot leave room for non-physical properties like 
aesthetic qualities as something not exclusively entrenched in the 
cognizing subject but as ―rooted in the object.‖ This particular rooting is 
so because only physical properties can be taken as real, while everything 
else has to count as only subjective. (3) However, what can be considered 
the most serious deficiency of Kant’s model is that ultimately it cannot 
account for empirical or contingent physical qualities either because it 
cannot give an explanation of the possibility of empirical laws, i.e., it 
cannot account for, to allude to Kant’s words, the possibility of the 
lawfulness of the contingent. The reason is that without empirical laws we 
would not be able to determine what qualifies as an empirical quality and 
what does not. 
These three points are not picked randomly. They address the three 
main problems Kant deals with in his third Critique, the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment. And with respect to all these problems Kant wants to 
convince us that the notion of the purposiveness of nature is necessary in 
order to solve them. Now, it is important to realize right at the beginning 
that this claim is not meant to be a claim as to how nature conceived 
independently of us is organized in itself, i.e., it is not the claim that what 
we have to presuppose as the matter of sensation is purposefully 
organized. Such a claim would be utterly senseless in a Kantian world, a 
claim of bad metaphysics, because we have not the slightest idea as to how 
this ―in itself‖ is arranged. What is meant with this claim is that we have to 
think of the epistemically accessible nature, i.e., that nature that is 
constituted by us, as purposefully organized. Or in other words, the claim 
that the notion of a purposefully organized nature is necessary in order for 
us to have experience is meant to answer the challenge set up by the task 
to integrate empirical laws, beauty, and organisms within an idealistic 
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framework of nature as constituted by us into what counts as an objective 
world. 
Very obviously three questions put themselves immediately. (1) Why is 
it that empirical laws, beauty and organisms become so important for 
Kant’s project? (2) How can the idea of the purposiveness of nature 
accomplish the task to make sense of empirical laws and to integrate 
beauty and organisms into Kant’s epistemic universe? (3) Is the solution 
Kant suggests successful, at least in his eyes? The answer to the last 
question seems to me to be: in part yes and in part no. The ―yes‖-part 
refers to his theory of beauty and of organisms, the ―no‖-part to the 
problem of empirical laws. The reasons I have for this negative judgment 
on the success of Kant’s solution in the case of the empirical-law-problem 
are somewhat superficial.
16
 Nonetheless they are serious enough not be 
dismissed easily. But I want to avoid a discussion of this topic within the 
confines of this paper and hence I just drop it. An exhaustive answer to the 
first question, even if restricted to beauty and organisms, cannot be given 
here either. Such an answer would mean to go into the details of Kant’s 
philosophical development.
17
 It must suffice to say that many of those who 
deal with this development have observed that Kant had a long-standing 
interest in issues concerning aesthetics starting in the 1760s. In the 1780s 
he became more interested in topics concerning empirical sciences
18
 and in 
 
 
 16. Here a sketch of two of these reasons: (1) I take it that the so-called ―transition-problem‖ in 
the Opus postumum, i.e., the problem of a transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science to (empirical) physics, consists in wrestling with the question of the possibility of empirical 
laws. Cf. DINA EMUNDTS, KANTS ÜBERGANGSKONZEPTION IM OPUS POSTUMUM: ZUR ROLLE DES 
NACHLAßWERKES FÜR DIE GRUNDLEGUNG DER EMPIRISCHEN PHYSIK (2004) (though Emundts thinks 
that this question does not arise out of problems within the third Critique). The thesis that the solution 
to the problem of empirical laws as suggested in the introductions to the third Critique lacks 
elaboration in the third Critique itself and has to be substantiated elsewhere, i.e., in the Opus 
postumum, is also put forward—with a different emphasis—by ECKART FÖRSTER, KANT’S FINAL 
SYNTHESIS: AN ESSAY ON THE OPUS POSTUMUM 1–24 (2000). If Kant were of the opinion that the 
third Critique had solved this problem, why then does he have this long-lasting late obsession with it? 
(2) The problem of the possibility of empirical laws plays an important role in both the printed and the 
unprinted versions of the introduction to the third Critique. However, one cannot say that this problem 
is addressed directly in the work itself, neither in the part on the aesthetic power of judgment nor in the 
teleological part. Thus it is hard to figure out what Kant would take to be the solution of this problem 
in the third Critique. At any rate there is no explicit solution presented by Kant. 
 17. For an informative overview of this development as well as of the voluminous literature 
dealing with it, see ANGELICA NUZZO, KANT AND THE UNITY OF REASON (2005). 
 18. See generally MICHAEL FRIEDMAN, KANT AND THE EXACT SCIENCES (1992); EMUNDTS, 
supra note 16. It makes sense to think of Kant as becoming interested in the philosophical status of the 
concept of purposiveness. This is not only because of more general epistemological questions but also 
because of biology and botany (Kant mentions Linné quite often). This is because, in these disciplines, 
the principle of purposiveness is used often just as an empirical principle. In Kant’s eyes, this use of 
the principle of purposiveness as an empirical principle is a serious obstacle to thinking of these 
disciplines as sciences. If this principle could be shown to be based on an a priori or even 
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the development of what are now called life sciences, especially biology 
and botany.
19
 However, it is not just this biographical background that can 
count as a motive for connecting beauty and organisms. It should be 
mentioned that, at least for Kant, the connection between beauty and 
organisms is quite intimate for philosophical reasons as well. According to 
him, both point to or hint at a purposefully organized nature because 
neither the one nor the other could be explained as belonging to the 
objective elements of constituted nature without relying on the notion of 
purposiveness. This is indicated quite nicely already in Kant’s letter to 
Reinhold (Dec. 1787) where Kant mentions for the first time the project of 
a Critique of Taste as a third part of philosophy, a project which then 
became the third Critique. There Kant characterizes this third part of his 
philosophy as teleology, though at that time he apparently did not even 
think of a theory of organisms as contained in this part but—as his 
working title suggests—conceived of it as an aesthetic theory.20 
This leaves us with the second question: how does the concept of 
purposiveness contribute to thinking of beauty and organisms as belonging 
to the objective elements of (by us) constituted nature? Even this question 
will not be answered in its entirety because the explanation Kant gives as 
to how beauty presupposes purposiveness is quite different from the one 
presented in the case of organisms.
21
 And to deal with both questions here 
 
 
transcendental principle then one could accept these disciplines as sciences. That the question of how 
to think of disciplines like biology and botany as sciences might have played a role in Kant’s interest 
in the concept of purposiveness could be seen confirmed by a footnote at the end of Section VIII of the 
Introduction to the third Critique where he writes: ―It is of use: to try of concepts which one needs as 
empirical principles a transcendental definition if there is reason to assume that they stand in a relation 
[in Verwandtschaft stehen] to the pure faculty of cognition a priori.‖ KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 14, 
at 230 (translation revised). 
 19. See ZAMMITO, supra note 1. 
 20. See ECKART FÖRSTER, THE TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY 103, 135–37 (Brady 
Bowman trans., 2012) for an interpretation of the letter in a way that allows Kant to take teleology to 
be a cover term both for aesthetics and organisms. 
 21. In the case of beauty, Kant argues roughly as follows: objects as far as they are constituted by 
us, i.e., as far they are possible objects of knowledge, have to be such that their constitution by us can 
stimulate our cognitive faculties to enter into what Kant calls ―the free play of faculties.‖ In order to do 
this, objects of knowledge have to be made up purposefully for the sake of these faculties. This is a 
subjective necessity, not an objective necessity. There is no rule for being able to judge (beurteilen) 
the constitution of an object of knowledge as beautiful because if objects were not constituted 
purposefully (by us), i.e., if they could not stimulate the free play, they could not be beautiful, and thus 
presumably not objects for us. This line of reasoning leads to interesting questions: (1) Are 
aesthetically neutral objects possible or must every possible object of knowledge have an aesthetic 
value? (2) Can ugliness be interpreted as absence of beauty or must it be taken as a self-standing, 
autonomous property? (3) Can aesthetic properties belong in sensu stricto only to objects of nature and 
of art? If so, does this mean that no ―beautiful souls‖ or beautiful (moral) feelings are possible? 
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is too much. I will concentrate on organisms or, in Kant’s terminology, 
―natural ends.‖ 
Here there is a basic dilemma. The one horn of it is the following: in 
order to think of natural ends or organisms as objects of knowledge we 
have to take them to be constituted by us in the very same way, i.e., 
according to the very same rules, as every other object that can be an 
object of knowledge is constituted, otherwise they could not be objects for 
us. This means we have to be able to interpret them as physical objects and 
this requirement means—because of the validity of the category of 
causality—we must interpret them as the products of causal-mechanical 
processes, i.e., as products of the interaction of moving forces. But—and 
this is the other horn of the dilemma—at the same time we have to 
acknowledge that we cannot account for organisms adequately by relying 
exclusively on those rules that are constitutive of objects of knowledge. 
This is so, as mentioned already earlier, because with these rules alone we 
can explain neither the production (Hervorbringung) of their forms nor 
their inner constitution. In order to do this we have to introduce the 
concept-pair ―whole and part‖ and to claim that an object whose form 
cannot be explained causal-mechanically is to be conceived as a whole for 
the sake of which its parts are organized in a certain way (and the other 
way round from the perspective of the parts). Talk that uses the phrase ―for 
the sake of‖ in order to describe the form of an organism already is talk 
invoking the notion of purposiveness because it implicitly makes use of 
the representation of an end and the means to realize it. Thus there is the 
dilemma that for an organism, in order to be an objective part of the 
epistemically accessible nature, it must be determined (in the sense of 
constituted) by the categories and at the same time it has to be 
acknowledged that the categories are not available in order to bring this 
determination about (because with them alone one cannot account for their 
form and their inner constitution). 
Now, the options Kant has for avoiding this dilemma are subject to 
several constraints. Two are especially noteworthy. (1) Kant cannot just 
introduce the concept of purposiveness as an additional category if he does 
not want to jeopardize the very basis of his critical epistemology as 
outlined in the first Critique. This is not only because of his claim that his 
list of fundamental, object-constituting concepts (categories) is a complete 
list (that means that his categories are not merely necessary but also 
sufficient in order to give us the concept of an object) but also because 
there seems to be no way to make causality compatible with 
purposiveness.  
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(2) Kant cannot declare organisms to be normal physical objects whose 
form just happens to be not subject to causal mechanical explanations, 
because this move would eliminate organisms as a genuine class of objects 
from the realm of epistemically accessible objects. The solution Kant 
eventually ends up with is well known and there is no need to go into the 
details here.
22
 He declares the concept of purposiveness to be a subjective 
transcendental principle of the reflective power of judgment and thus the 
principle by which we can judge (beurteilen) organisms. What is meant by 
this formula exactly is hard to figure out. However, what is quite easy to 
see is why Kant could think that this solution can help save organisms as a 
legitimate class of real objects in nature as it is constituted by us in 
accordance with our epistemic needs. The leading idea could be thus 
articulated: if nature, (understood as an object of knowledge), has to be 
conceived of as containing two kinds of real objects, namely those whose 
form can be explained by causal-mechanical processes and those whose 
form can only be accounted for by introducing purposeful structures, then 
there must be principles (concepts) determining their constitution in such a 
way that both kinds of objects can be integrated into nature as distinctive 
kinds of natural objects. If there are good reasons (and Kant thinks there 
are) to claim that these principles are such that they allow only objects 
whose form can be explained in a causal-mechanical way to be genuine 
objects of knowledge then in order to account for organisms as authentic, 
full-blown objects as parts of an epistemically accessible nature there must 
be some special principle according to which they are constituted by us. 
Otherwise, organisms would be but subjective and in some contexts useful 
fictions somehow made up from and based on representations of correctly 
constituted, i.e., real, physical objects. Such a principle cannot be based on 
one of the standard concepts of object constitution because these concepts 
cannot explain what makes organisms a special kind of objects, i.e., their 
form. Thus it has to be a principle that is constitutive with respect to 
objects of nature, the special forms of which cannot be explained by 
causal-mechanical processes, i.e., that are constitutive of organisms. At the 
same time this special principle has to be taken as constitutive in a 
different sense from the ―normal‖ constitutive principles (based on the 
categories). This special principle is constitutive in the sense that it 
provides the means for us to accept as a real object something that does 
not conform in every respect to the conceptual demands on what a real 
 
 
 22. See Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment?, in KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS: THE THREE CRITIQUES AND THE 
OPUS POSTUMUM 157, 157 (Eckart Förster ed., 1989). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:81 
 
 
 
 
object is. This makes it a subjective principle because it is just necessary 
for us in order to allow organisms to be judged (beurteilt)—not 
explained—as real objects within the categorically constituted realm of 
nature or within what could be called ―our nature.‖ And it has to be the 
principle of purposiveness because, according to Kant, only on the basis of 
this principle can one give an account of the origin of the form of 
organisms. 
As already said above—this is just meant to be a short sketch of what I 
take to be Kant’s leading idea in introducing the principle of 
purposiveness in the third Critique as a necessary constitutive, i.e., in his 
language a transcendental, principle which nevertheless is only 
subjectively valid. The principle of purposiveness—understood as a means 
of allowing organisms to be real objects of nature within a philosophical 
framework whose distinctive claim is that what is real is constituted by 
us—seems to me to answer a problem that Kant in the first Critique either 
did not recognize or did not think of as a problem. Whether this answer 
really is convincing depends on how one assesses the plausibility of the 
main elements of Kant’s theory of purposiveness as presented in the third 
Critique. It also depends on how this answer can be brought in line with 
what Kant takes to be the problems it solves. These elements as well as 
those problems have not even been touched here.
23
 Among the elements 
Kant relies on in this context is first of all his conception of a reflective 
power of judgment that is introduced in order to make sure that the 
principle of purposiveness can be thought of as constitutive without 
making it an objective principle. Among the problems Kant hopes to solve 
with his theory of purposiveness, the most prominent is what he calls the 
antinomy of the power of reflective judgment. This power is a 
contradiction between the causal-mechanical and teleological views of 
nature and which can be resolved only if one gives both views a regulative 
status. But neither the elements nor the problems Kant addresses, nor the 
problems connected with Kant’s discussion can be dealt with in this paper. 
So, what then should be taken to be the positive result of Kant’s 
occupation with purposiveness in the Critique of the Power of Judgment? 
If one is inclined to follow the line of reasoning presented here, the most 
remarkable outcome seems to me that Kant in the third Critique succeeds 
(at least in principle) to integrate organisms into the domain of real objects 
 
 
 23. For a very informative discussion of both the elements and the problems, as well as the 
problems connected with them, see Hannah Ginsborg, Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/kant-
aesthetics (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
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(of knowledge) without giving up his idealistic conception of object 
constitution as developed in the first Critique. Organisms are genuine 
members of a nature that is considered to be the product of our conceptual 
activities though their production requires a somewhat special conceptual 
tool, namely the principle of purposiveness—this statement in my eyes 
summarizes adequately the position he is arguing for. But one should also 
bear in mind that it is not only the topic of organisms that is at stake for 
Kant when it comes to purposiveness. As was already mentioned, for Kant 
purposiveness understood subjectively is fundamental for his aesthetic 
theory, and understood objectively it is the key to almost everything that 
has to be counted as contingent for our epistemic abilities, thus giving the 
basis for what could be called his theory of the empirical (laws, concepts, 
etc.). And, last but not least, it should not be disregarded that this 
conception of purposiveness opens for Kant the way to give what he 
thinks to be a rational justification of the inevitability of the idea of God, 
thereby transforming an essential element of metaphysics from a natural 
disposition (in the first Critique) into something that reason demands.  
All this did not preclude that Kant already in his time and until now did 
not earn that much recognition for his principle of purposiveness 
especially in its teleological version from those who thought of themselves 
as his followers. It is not without irony that it was G.W.F. Hegel—one of 
Kant’s most profound critics and at the same time one of his most careful 
readers—who was quite convinced that this principle had its peculiar 
merits in philosophy. In section 204 of his Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830) Hegel writes, ―[w]ith the concept of inner 
purposiveness, Kant has revitalized the idea in general and especially the 
idea of life.‖24 Though this assessment might not find support that easily in 
the letter of Kant’s philosophy, it certainly captures its spirit.25 
 
 
 24. G.W.F. HEGEL, ENZYKLOPÄDIE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN IM GRUNDRISSE 
178 (Friedhelm Nicolin & Otto Pöggeler eds., 1959) (1830) (translation by author). In the original 
German: ―[m]it dem Begriffe von innerer Zweckmäßigkeit hat Kant die Idee überhaupt und 
insbesondere die des Lebens wieder erweckt.‖ 
 25. See id. This text has a somewhat complicated history. It originates from some notes I made 
almost five years ago with the aim to transform them into a paper to be presented at an event designed 
to celebrate the 60th birthday of Paul Guyer. Somehow this event never took place. I nevertheless 
pursued the topic and drafted a couple of versions that I presented orally at several institutions over the 
years. Though the birthday is long gone I still think of this final version of the paper as an homage to 
Paul Guyer, the eminent Kant scholar and a very good friend. I am, as always, grateful to Dina 
Emundts for her helpful comments on almost all versions of this text. 
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